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make little reference to other chapters in the book. On occasion, such as in the chapters on freedom of
expression and on social rights, the analysis and conclusions that are reached seem to apply only to each
piece of legislation reviewed, and a common framework is not really developed for all situations falling
within the same individual fundamental rights.
The absence of a theoretical framework would also seem to be relevant for the achievement of the
author’s own goals. As noted on p.6, three questions arise in the context of the relation between fundamental
rights and positive market integration: (i) does the legislator consciously and expressly pursue an internal
market fundamental rights policy?; (ii) what is the state of internal market harmonisation practices on
fundamental rights?; and (iii) what is the substantive level of fundamental rights protection achieved
through the ongoing interplay between the EU courts and legislator? All such questions require the
development of normative benchmarks for their assessment. However, the author produces no normative
benchmark or theory. The lack of a normative frameworkmeans that the very questions identified as being
important in a study about fundamental rights in internal market legislation eventually go unanswered, or
are answered merely on a case-by-case basis, usually by reference to the justificatory or explanatory
wording of the instrument analysed.
Lastly, the adoption of an overarching theoretical framework would open the door to other avenues of
analysis. It would permit, for example, an assessment of how the institutional and normative realities
underpinning the interaction between various entities that give meaning and content to fundamental rights’
provisions impact the ultimate content and construction of these provisions—something the author does
not do, even though the book is full of references to how the European courts have construed fundamental
rights in the light of secondary legislation and national practices, and to how internal market legislation
ultimately reflect or fail to reflect fundamental rights. A theoretical framework would also prove useful
in mapping the relationships between the EU’s fundamental market freedoms and fundamental
rights—particularly where they overlap—and the relationship between Treaty derogations and other
non-market balancing mechanisms for ensuring the coherence of EU law. Lastly, such a theory would
justify and provide support for the author’s various normative assessments, which usually presume that
the reader shares the author’s normative preferences.
All these criticisms should not detract, however, from the value of this piece of work that breaks ground
in an unexplored area of the law. This book belongs in the libraries of EU policy-makers, organisations
devoted to the promotion of fundamental rights, and anyone with an interest in fundamental rights in the
EU, particularly as regards data protection, freedom of expression, social rights and health policy.
Pedro Caro de Sousa
University of Reading
Parliaments and the European Court of Human Rights, by Alice Donald and Philip
Leach, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 386pp., hardback, £95, ISBN:
9780198734246.
As explained by the authors in their introduction, the subject of parliaments’ role in the implementation
of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is a highly topical one, in particular against
the background of a Convention system facing pressures of both an institutional and political nature. On
the one hand, despite improvements, the ECtHR continues to suffer from a serious backlog in the processing
of applications. Moreover, the authors argue that the Convention system is affected by an implementation
crisis, attested by the high number of non-executed judgments pending before the Committee of Ministers,
the Council of Europe body responsible for supervising the execution of ECtHR judgments. On the other
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hand, the legitimacy of the ECtHR has, in recent years, been vehemently challenged by domestic politicians,
most notably in but not confined to the UK. In order to face these institutional and political pressures,
“subsidiarity” has become the new buzzword within the political discussions on the reform of the
Convention system. As noted by the authors, this concern with subsidiarity has resulted in an increased
recognition within the Council of Europe of the necessity of parliamentary engagement in ensuring
Convention compliance and of parliamentary involvement in the domestic systems of implementation.
This is reflected inter alia in the 2012 Brighton and 2015 Brussels Declarations on the future of the
Convention system, as well as in the work of the Parliamentary Assembly, which has recognised that,
“national parliaments must now play a more proactive role in [supervising the execution of ECtHR
judgments]; if this is not done, the key role of the Convention, its supervisory mechanism and the
Council of Europe as a whole, in guaranteeing the effective protection of human rights in Europe is
likely to be put in jeopardy.” (PACE, Doc.12455 (2010)).
The authors’ focus lies on the role of parliaments in monitoring the executive response to adverse judgments
by the ECtHR and in adopting legislative measures in order to ensure compliance with such judgments.
The book is divided into two parts. In the first part, the authors provide a general discussion of the
relationship between national parliaments and the Convention system in its broader institutional, political
and normative aspects. Overall, this part could have benefited from some succinctness; particularly the
chapter in which the authors discuss the Strasbourg system at length is somewhat redundant for the rest
of the discussion. However, in this part, the authors do succeed in setting the theoretical stage for what
follows, for example by providing an extensive overview of the different institutional models for
parliamentary engagement with human rights matters—specialised, mainstreamed or hybrid committee
structures—and their respective advantages and disadvantages.
In the second part, the authors set out the findings of their case studies in a diverse selection of five
States: Ukraine, Romania, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany. With respect to all of these States, the
authors discuss the legal and political landscape, the system of implementation of ECtHR judgments and
the respective roles of parliament and the executive therein. In order to gain an understanding of the
micro-processes involved in the implementation of ECtHR judgments at the national level, for each State,
by way of example, the authors discuss the implementation of a number of judgments which have required
legal reform at the domestic level. Remarkably, the authors fail, however, to provide any criteria for the
selection of these judgments. While the authors thereby offer a cursory but somewhat random overview
of the complexity of implementation politics, the wide diversity of issues raised in the respective States
precludes anymeaningful attempt to explain cross-national implementation variance. Can onemeaningfully
draw any lessons from comparing, say, prisoner voting rights in the UK with property restitution in
Romania? The absence of any criteria for selecting cases and the absence of a genuine engagement by the
authors with the relevant cross-national similarities and differences raises the question as to the authors’
rationale for adopting a multinational focus. Perhaps more interesting results could have been obtained
by adopting a thematic approach in which the focus lies on particular subject areas and on how similar
issues have been addressed across different States, allowing more meaningful engagement with
cross-national variance.
The authors conclude that the most important factors determining the effectiveness of the implementation
of ECtHR judgments are the capacity and the political will of the state actors involved in the implementation
process (p.303). Based on their case studies, they do not discern any independent impact of the different
institutional models nor of the existence of implementation legislation, as has been adopted by a number
of these States: in the absence of political commitment, neither are a guarantee of effective implementation
(p.304). In their conclusions, the authors make a number of proposals aimed at improving parliamentary
capacity in dealing with human rights matters.
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The authors seem to be extremely optimistic when it comes to the positive influence that parliamentary
involvement may have on the implementation of ECtHR judgments. At the very beginning of the book,
the authors state their central argument to be that invigorating the role of parliaments in Council of Europe
Member States is crucial to alleviating institutional and political pressures on the Convention system (p.2).
They consider that,
“national parliaments and the ECtHR can be construed as existing not in a hierarchical relationship,
but in a partnership whose purpose is the shared endeavour of realizing human rights internationally.”
(p.153)
In discussing the alleged lack of democratic legitimacy of the ECtHR, they consider that,
“international human rights regimes enrich, rather than diminish, the democratic process at the national
level—and enhance, rather than undermine, the democratic credentials of domestic decision-makers”
(p.129).
in particular by lending greater legitimacy to domestic legal reform.
The authors do address the question as to the feasibility and likely effectiveness of increasing
parliamentary involvement in the implementation of ECtHR judgments, as well as whether this would
risk leading to an undue politicisation of the implementation process. However, instead of being prompted
to question whether their optimism is justified, the authors interpret problematic examples like the prisoner
voting saga in the UK to be evidence of,
“the desirability of requiring parliament at the earliest possible stage to engage with specific legislative
proposals and reasoned, justificatory arguments about the meaning and scope of rights and the
necessity and proportionality of restrictions upon them.” (p.107)
According to the authors, there is no evidence that “more” parliamentary engagement leads to “less”
implementation, and they consider that holding such a view “appears unduly pessimistic about the potential
for parliamentarians to strengthen compliance” (pp.106–107). However, the opposite holds true as well,
and one may wonder whether, in the absence of any evidence to support such views, the authors are not
unduly optimistic about the positive influence of parliamentary engagement on implementation. While it
may indeed be normatively feasible for parliaments to engage in a human rights-friendly manner with the
implementation of ECtHR judgments, the case studies conducted by the authors do not bring them closer
to establishing in an empirical manner that parliamentary engagement would result in more effective
implementation compared with a merely executive-driven process of implementation. While the authors
do not as such claim that their case studies show the latter to be the case, their research is nonetheless
clearly based on such assumption. Given the strong normative views held by the authors in this respect,
it is a missed opportunity that they did not attempt to test this assumption empirically. The research design,
however, did not allow for a test of this assumption, since the authors made the methodological choice to
only focus on “most likely cases” where at least some parliamentary engagement in the implementation
process was likely to be present, given the existence of some type of parliamentary structure or mechanism
designed to monitor the implementation of ECtHR judgments (p.14).
All in all, the book is a valuable contribution to the debate on the role of parliaments in the process of
implementing human rights standards and will be a rich resource for any academic interested in this subject,
as well as for any actor involved in the process of implementing ECtHR judgments at the national level.
Despite some of the methodological reservations formulated above, the authors must definitely be lauded
for their rigour, having undertaken the impressive number of 92 semi-structured interviews with relevant
actors and having demonstrated their ability to acquaint themselves with the complexities of implementation
in a wide range of different legal systems. They have certainly succeeded in providing food for thought
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for policy-makers on how to strengthen the implementation process. In this regard, it is laudable that the
authors swim against the current by providing a constructive proposal to strengthen the ECtHR’s democratic
legitimacy through increased parliamentary engagement in the face of growing ECtHR scepticism.
Moreover, they have successfully put the subject of parliamentary engagement with the implementation
process on the academic agenda. As with any good academic work, the book has succeeded in raising
more new questions than it provides answers, and one can only hope that it will inspire further research
in this area.
Laurens Lavrysen
Ghent University
European Constitutional Language, by András Jakab, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2016), xviii + 511pp., hardback, £89.99, ISBN: 978-1-107-13078-4.
This book is ambitious both in its scope and self-styled objective, as it aims at providing “a theory for
constitutional lawyers about fundamental questions of European constitutional law” and mapping “the
immense literature on these questions” (p.1). In so doing, it suggests a language, i.e. a list of key concepts,
for the discourse of constitutional law.
No less ambitious are the methodological underlying assumptions: constitutional discourse is described
as a collective endeavour in which politicians, scholars, judges and, exceptionally, the people take part.
The task of constitutional theory is identified as suggesting a language for the current constitutional
discourse. In spite (or perhaps because) of its theoretical ambitions, this theoretical effort does not refrain
from admitting its inherent (and, to a certain extent, desirable) political bias: as a matter of fact, the task
of lawyers is to tame social and political conflicts and to transform them into technical-legal issues. Thus,
the law—and even more so constitutional law—is intrinsically political, but has to be kept distinct from
day-by-day political routine. This is an interesting way of presenting the fundamental tasks of constitutional
lawyers, as a standard definition by Francisco Rubio Llorente describes constitutions as the form of political
power (La forma del poder: Estudio sobre la Constitución (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y
Constitucionales, 1993)).
Having in mind this background, the key concepts of constitutional law are defined as “historical
responses to social challenges” (p.7). A number of circumstances and topical challenges, as well as the
author’s commitment to “a strong and unified Europe” (p.10), make the case for a European, rather than
global of purely national, constitutional theory.
The book is divided into three parts: grammar, suggested vocabulary, and redundant vocabulary. The
rules of constitutional reasoning are identified as the grammar of a constitutional language.
In Ch.2, the author introduces his own notion of constitution—a norm or a group of norms which are
of the highest rank in a legal order in the sense that the validity of all other norms is measured on them—and
makes some basic points with regard to constitutional reasoning. Some of them deserve specific mention,
e.g. the idea that constitutional interpretation “should be understood as just a specific case of statutory
interpretation”, and the attempt to classify the structure of legal arguments and to clarify the methods of
constitutional interpretation in order to minimise the impact of subjective factors. Chapter 3 discusses
four major types of interpretive arguments: textualist, systemic, evaluative and comparative or scholarly
arguments. However, the latter only have persuasive force. Although constitutional interpretation is seen
as not radically distinct from statutory interpretation, there are good reasons for giving evaluative arguments
a slightly greater weight than usual when it comes to interpreting constitutional clauses. “Evaluative
arguments” is an umbrella definition for arguments which “do not refer to the legal provision itself or its
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